Punishment for Sale by Selman Donna - Leighton Paul

Author:Selman, Donna - Leighton, Paul [Selman, Donna - Leighton, Paul]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781442201729
Published: 0101-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

The Prison-Industrial Complex 101

Private prison executives claim that they do not push for longer sentencing policies. “You don’t see CCA advocating for longer sentences; that’s not true. If government, through its elected representatives, identified that, well, we are going to need to provide for public safety by incarcerating individuals—that is not a vendor-driven issue,” says James Ball, CCA’s vice president of customer relations (Biewen 2002). Others are skeptical (Ollson 2002; Biewen 2002). The proposals to incarcerate more people for longer benefit these executives, and given the various risk factors and disclosures from SEC documents noted earlier, it is difficult to believe that private prison companies limit their advocacy through ALEC to privatization issues only.

ALEC’s reports were credited for the 1998 passage of truth-in-sentencing legislation in Wisconsin (Biewen 2002), a CCA customer, which resulted in overcrowded facilities in that state, increasing the use of private prisons.

And CCA would like everyone to believe this is just a coincidence.

BOX 3.2. GEO GROUP ARGUES AGAINST GREATER

DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

As owners of the company, shareholders can introduce proposals that can become company policy if approved by a majority of the company’s shareholders. Usually, proposals do not become policy without the support of management, which owns a large numbers of shares and whose support or opposition guides the voting of many large shareholders. In 2008, an activist group of nuns introduced a resolution to shareholders of the GEO Group to advocate greater disclosure of political contributions in the name of transparency and accountability for corporate spending on political activities. Management of GEO opposed the measure, and shareholders voted against it. Here is their resolution and rationale, along with management’s response, taken directly from GEO’s 14 DEF filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (GEO

Group 2008b).

Shareholder Proposal Requesting Semi-Annual Disclosure of Political Contributions

The Mercy Investment Program, 205 Avenue C, #10E, New York, New York 10009, which is the beneficial owner of 360 shares of GEO stock, has filed the following shareholder proposal:

“Resolved: that the shareholders of The GEO Group hereby request that our Company provide a report, updated semi-annually, disclosing our Company’s: 1. Policies and procedures for political contributions and expenditures, both direct and indirect, made with corporate funds.

2. Monetary and non-monetary political contributions and expenditures not deductible under section 162(e)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code, including but not limited to contributions to or expenditures on behalf of political candidates,

102

Chapter 3

political parties, political committees and other political entities organized and operating under 26 USC Sec. 527 of the Internal Revenue Code and any portion of any dues or similar payments made to any tax exempt organization that is used for an expenditure or contribution if made directly by the corporation would not be deductible under section 162(e)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code. The report shall include the following:

a. An accounting of our Company’s funds that are used for political contributions or expenditures as described above;

b. Identification of the person or persons in our Company who participated in making the decisions to make political contribution or expenditure; and c.

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